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CRIMINAL LAW-New Mexico Applies the Strict
Elements Test to the Collateral Felony DoctrineState v. Campos
I. INTRODUCTION
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v. Campos,
felony murder conviction based on the underlying felony of first-degree criminal
sexual penetration.3 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that, under the strict
elements test, first-degree criminal sexual penetration is collateral to or independent
of second-degree murder.4 Although the strict elements test traditionally has been
limited to double jeopardy analysis, the Campos court extended the strict elements
test to collateral felony analysis.5 Thus, the Campos decision reflects a shift in New
Mexico's criminal jurisprudence. 6 The Campos court further concluded that the
defendant's conviction and sanction for both first-degree criminal sexual
penetration and first-degree felony murder violated his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy, reflecting a departure from New Mexico's traditional
double jeopardy analysis.
This Note first describes the facts involved and decision rendered in Campos. An
historical overview of the application of the felony murder doctrine and the
methodology employed by New Mexico courts in analyzing an individual's
protection against double jeopardy follows. The Note then analyzes the court's
rationale in the Campos decision. Finally, the implications of this decision for the
felony murder rule and double jeopardy analysis in New Mexico are discussed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In State v. Campos, the defendant was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual
penetration (CSP)9 and first-degree felony murder" after waiving his right to a jury
trial." The victim, Victor Gutierrez, and the defendant had been drinking heavily
on June 12, 1992, and engaging in horseplay with sexual overtones at Lisa Salcido's
II.

8

1. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1994); see also State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439,564
P.2d 1321 (1977).
2. 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266 (1996).
3. See id. at 162, 921 P.2d at 1280.
4. See id. at 156, 921 P.2d at 1274.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 162, 921 P.2d at 1280.
8. No. 92-146 (Dist. Ct. N.M. May 13, 1993)(Campos i).
9. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-1 l(A)(Repl. Pamp. 1994) (Criminal Offenses Act). The statute defines
criminal sexual penetration as "the unlawful and intentional causing of a person to engage in... anal intercourse
...to any extent and with any object, of the genital or anal openings of another, whether or not there is any
emission." Id.; see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (C)(2)(Repl. Pamp. 1994). This section defines first-degree

criminal sexual penetration as "all sexual penetration perpetrated... by the use of force or coercion that results in
great bodily harm or great mental anguish to the victim." Id.

10. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2)(Repl. Pamp. 1994). The Act defines first-degree murder as the
"killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which
death may be caused... in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony." Id.
11. See Campos I, No. 92-146 (Dist. Ct. N.M. May 13, 1993).
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home. 2 At approximately 2:00 a.m., Campos laid Gutierrez in the front yard and
stripped Gutierrez of his clothing. The two men re-entered Ms. Salcido's home
where the naked Gutierrez was acting like a dog. At some point, someone remarked
that Gutierrez should have a tail. Gutierrez attempted to walk home but fell to the
ground. Shortly thereafter, Campos laid Gutierrez on the front lawn. Laughing and
calling for others to watch, he twice impaled into Gutierrez's anus with the entire
length of a mop handle causing severe internal bleeding and later his death. 3
The trial court judge convicted and sentenced the defendant for both first-degree
CSP and first-degree felony murder. 4 On direct appeal to the New Mexico Supreme
Court, 5 Campos argued that his conviction for first-degree felony murder should
be reversed.' 6 He argued that the felony-murder rule was inapplicable in this case
because the first-degree CSP was not collateral to or independent of the victim's
murder. 7 Campos argued that Gutierrez died as a direct result of the CSP.'5
Therefore, Campos' action underlying the CSP and the homicide comprised of a
single, unitary act, not two independent actions. Campos also argued that his
conviction and sanction for both first-degree CSP and first-degree felony murder
violated his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 9
Under the strict elements test," the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that
first-degree CSP is collateral to or independent of homicide.2' CSP is not a lesser
included offense or sub-set of second-degree murder.22 Thus, Campos committed
two independent acts. However, the court concluded that under the identical strict
elements test, Campos' conviction and sanction for both first-degree CSP and firstdegree felony murder violated the double jeopardy provision of both the state and

12. See Campos 122 N.M. at 150, 921 P.2d at 1268. Unless otherwise specified, the facts in this section
are taken from the New Mexico Supreme Court in the Campos decision found at 122 N.M. 148, 921 P.2d 1266
(1996).
13. See id. at 150-51,921 P.2d at 1268-69. The two men were in the home and front yard of Lisa Salcido
and her boyfriend, Bernie Baca. See id. Baca later called the police. See id. Campos was arrested that morning at
Salcido's house. See id. at 151, 921 P.2d at 1269. Gutierrez was rushed by ambulance to the hospital where he died
of internal bleeding. The mop punctured his intestine, liver, diaphragm, pericardial sac of his heart, injured his lung
and "ended by bulging the skin near his shoulder" where Campos left the mop. Id.
14. See id.
15. See N.M. R. APP. P. 12-102 (A)(1) (appeals from the district court in which a sentence of death or life
imprisonment has been imposed shall be taken directly to the New Mexico Supreme Court).
16. See Campos 122 N.M. at 150, 921 P.2d at 1268.
17. See id. at 151,921 P.2dat 1269.
18. See id. at 153, 921 P.2d at 1271.
19. See id. Campos argued three additional grounds for reversal in his appeal to the New Mexico Supreme
Court: 1) that the trial court erred in convicting him of first-degree felony murder because the trier of fact found
reasonable doubt as to his intent to kill or knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to Victor Gutierrez; 2) that his severe intoxication should serve as a defense to first-degree felony
murder; and 3) that he was denied his constitutional right to confront one of the witnesses. See id. None of these
issues is the focus of this Note. For a discussion of intoxication as a defense to murder, see Vicki Zelle, Note,
CRIMINAL LAW-The Anomaly of a Murder:Not All First-DegreeMurderMens Rea StandardsAre Equal-State
v. Brown, 28 N.M. L. REV. _ (1998).
20. See discussion infra Part W.A.
21. See Campos 122 N.M. at 156,921 P.2d at 1276. Traditionally, New Mexico courts employed the strict
elements test solely in the double jeopardy arena. The Campos court expanded the use of the strict elements test
to felony murder analysis to determine whether an underlying felony is collateral to or independent of the homicide.
See id. at 155, 921 P.2d at 1273.
22. See id. at 156, 921 P.2d at 1276.
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federal constitutions' because Campos committed one act that caused the victim's
death.
III. HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND
24
The felony murder doctrine is rooted in English common law. All homicide
"committed during the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of a felony
26
constituted felony murder,"2 5 sanctioned by death. "Few legal doctrines have been
27
as maligned and yet have shown as great a resiliency as the felony-murder rule,"2
which has been described as "an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law"
and "an anachronisitic remnant [thathas] 'no logical or practical basis for existence
in modem law." 29 Modem jurisdictions have criticized and limited the application
of the felony murder rule to varying degrees. Some of the distinct and varied state
approaches include those of Kansas, California, and Arizona. For example, Kansas
courts focus their inquiry on whether the underlying felony and the homicide may
be considered a unitary act.3 The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned that:
Time, distance, and the causal relationship between the underlying felony and
the killing are factors to be considered in determining whether the killing is a
part of the felony and, therefore, subject to the felony murder rule. The
collateral felony must, therefore, be felonious conduct other than the lethal act
31
itself... the lethal act itself cannot serve as the independent collateral felony.
Thus, Kansas courts employ several factors to determine whether the underlying
felony was part of or caused the homicide. Such an approach grants the judiciary
much discretion in determining whether the underlying felony and homicide were
committed by a single act.
California's inquiry, however, concentrates on the criminal's independent
felonious design or intent.32 The felony murder rule applies only when the defendant
did not intend to kill his victim. If the defendant intended to kill, he may not be
convicted of first-degree felony murder. California courts focus solely on the
defendant's mens rea regardless of the defendant's actions. Thus, the California
felony murder rule serves to deter accidental homicides that occur during "the

23. See id. The New Mexico Supreme Court also held that: 1) the reasonable doubt found by the trial court
was not a factual dispute to be considered on appeal, see Campos 122 N.M. at 157, 921 P.2d at 1275; and 2)
intoxication fails to be a defense to first-degree felony murder, see id. at 161,921 P.2d at 1279.
24. See State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977).
25. Id. at 441, 564 P.2d at 1323.
26. See id. Irrespective of whether a death occurred, most felonies were punishable by death regardless of
the criminals intent or the heinousness of the felony. See id.
27. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-MurderRule: A Doctrine at ConstitutionalCrossroads,
70 CORNELL L REV. 446, 446 (1985).
28. H.L Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO LJ. 1, 4 (1973).
29. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980)(quoting Roy Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law
with Recommendations, 51 KY. L. J. 59, 82 (1962)).
30. See State v. Prouse, 767 P.2d 1308 (Kan. 1989).
31. Id. at 1313 (citations omitted).
32. See, e.g., People v. Mattison, 481 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1978) (unitary felonious act served as the collateral
felony when criminal did not intend to kill). But see People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 1030-31 (Cal. 1994)(willful
discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling served as the collateral felony for first-degree felony murder when
an occupant was killed).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

course of committing a felony."33 Such an approach seems counter-intuitive because
it is close to impossible to deter individuals from committing accidental shootings.
Arizona statutorily enumerated certain felonious conduct resulting in death that
would elevate a homicide to first-degree felony murder.34 Regardless of the
criminal's felonious purpose or whether the felony and the homicide were a unitary
act, Arizona courts simply look to the statutes in determining the applicability of the
felony murder rule.35 Such an approach ensures that the judiciary comports with
legislative intent, avoids confusion among the courts regarding a criminal's mens
rea, and alleviates convoluted tests to determine which underlying felonies are
collateral to the homicide.
New Mexico does not statutorily enumerate which felonies, in concert with
homicide, result in first-degree felony murder. Arising from both legislative
enactments36 and judicial interpretations, 37 New Mexico's approach to felony
murder is distinct from that found in other states. Ultimately, New Mexico's
legislature and judiciary have defined felony murder as second-degree murder
committed during the course of an inherently dangerous felony. 3 However, in an
attempt to curb the broad use of the felony murder rule, the New Mexico judiciary
enunciated three limitations to New Mexico's distinct version of felony murder.39
A. New Mexico's Felony Murder Doctrine
The definition of felony murder in New Mexico significantly differs from that
in other jurisdictions in that New Mexico insists that persons convicted of felony
murder have a mens rea denoting an intent to kill. The New Mexico Supreme Court
defined first-degree felony murder as second-degree murder' committed during the
course of an inherently dangerous felony.4 '
In State v. Ortega, the New Mexico Supreme Court "imposed a mens rea
requirement for felony murder,"'42 explicitly overruling its precedent that the felony

33.

People v. Smith, 678 P.2d 886, 891 (Cal. 1984) (citations omitted).

34. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1105.A.2. (West 1997) (such conduct includes: committing or
attempting to commit sexual conduct with a minor; sexual assault; molestation of a child; marijuana offenses;
dangerous drug offenses; narcotics offenses; involving or using minors in drug offenses; kidnapping; burglary;
arson; robbery; escape; child abuse; or unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle). See also State
v. Miniefield, 522 P.2d 25 (Ariz. 1974) (arson is felonious conduct that was statutorily enumerated to elevate a
homicide to first-degree felony murder).
35. See Miniefield,522 P.2d at 25.

36. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2)(Repl. Pamp. 1994).
37. See, e.g., State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439,441,564 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1977); State v. Ortega, 112 N.M.
554, 817 P.2d 1196 (1991).
38. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(2); see also Harrison,90 N.M. at 439,564 P.2d at 1321.

39. See Harrison90 N.M. at 441,564 P.2d at 1323; see discussion infra Part ll1.B.
40. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994). The statute defines second-degree murder as the
killing of "another human being without lawful justification or excuse... if in performing the acts which cause
the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or
another." Id. To be convicted of second-degree murder in New Mexico, the defendant must have possessed the
intent to kill. See Ortega, 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205 (establishing that a defendant must have possessed
the requisite mens rea).
41. See Ortega, 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205.
42. Ortega, 112 N.M. at 563,817 P.2d at 1205; (quoting State v. Lopez, 122 N.M. 63, 65,920 P.2d 1017,
1019 (1996).
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murder rule required no mens rea.43 In Ortega, the defendant kidnapped two girls
who looked rich" and were wearing jewelry because he wanted to buy cocaine."
4
After beating the girl that was driving, he stabbed her thirty-eight times. ' The
6 The court held that
defendant then stabbed the passenger over forty-five times.'
New Mexico's felony murder rule requires both causation and intent to kill or
knowledge that one's actions "create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm."4 7 Therefore, the prosecution was required to prove that Ortega intended to
48
kill the two women after he kidnapped and stabbed them.
Limitations on New Mexico's Felony Murder Rule
Prior to Ortega, the New Mexico Supreme Court had placed statutory and
judicial limitations on the felony murder doctrine. New Mexico's initial reform of
B.

43. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 109 N.M. 596,601,788 P.2d 352, 357 (1990) (stating that the requisite mens
rea may be inferred when a death occurs during the commission of an inherently dangerous felony); State v. Price
104 N.M. 703, 704, 726 P.2d 857, 858 (1986) (explicitly holding that the felony murder doctrine imposes no mens
rea requirement).
Until 1990, New Mexico courts held that the felony murder doctrine required no mens tea. See Pierce 109 N.M.
at 601,788 P.2d at 357; see also Price 104 N.M. at 704, 726 P.2d at 858 (although felony murder requires no mens
tea, felony murder may be intentionally committed)(citations omitted).
In Pierce, the court held that the mens tea for first-degree felony murder may be inferred from the commission
of the felony. See Pierce 109 N.M. at 601,788 P.2d at 357. Although the defendant in Pierce was mentally ill and
therefore lacked malice aforethought, her first-degree felony murder conviction was upheld because the homicide
occurred during the commission of the kidnapping and child abuse. See id. at 597, 601, 788 P.2d at 353, 357.
Ultimately, the prosecution bore no burden of proving the defendant's requisite mens tea-the intent to kill or
minimal knowledge that her actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. See Price 104 N.M.
at 704, 726 P.2d at 858.
The Ortega court overruled Price and Pierce for three reasons. First, the court stated that crimes involving
homicide are "generally attended by moral culpability" and thus should not be considered a strict liability crime.
See Ortega 112 N.M. at 562, 817 P.2d at 1204. Unlike homicide, strict-liability crimes generally have minimum
sentencing. The court further noted that courts and legislatures believe that the state must bear the burden of
proving the requisite mens rea. See id.; see also Price 104 N.M. at 705, 726 P.2d at 859.
Secondly, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require every element of an offense
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ortega 112 N.M. at 562, 817 P.2d at 1204; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442
U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)). Therefore, New Mexico's murder
statute requires proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim or minimally knew his or her actions "create[d]
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm" to the victim. N.M. STAT. ANN.' 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
The New Mexico Supreme Court expressly held that "unintentional or accidental killing[s] will not suffice" to
elevate a homicide committed during the course of an inherently dangerous felony to first-degree felony murder.
See Ortega 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205.
Third, New Mexico's homicide provision of the criminal code expressly imposes a mens rea requirement for
both first-degree and second-degree murder. See Ortega 112 N.M. at 564, 817 P.2d at 1206. The criminal sanction
for first-degree murder is death or life imprisonment. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-14 (Repl. Pamp. 1994). The
criminal sanction for second-degree murder is nine years imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $12,500. See N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15(A)(2) and 31-18-15 (D)(2). The supreme court determined that, consonant with legislative
intent, felony murder necessarily imposed a mens rea requirement. See Ortega 112 N.M. at 563, 817 P.2d at 1205;
see also State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 153, 921 P.2d 1266, 1271 (1996).
44. See Ortega 112 N.M. at 557-58, 817 P.2d at 1199-1200.
45. See id. at 558, 817 P.2d at 1200.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 566, 817 P.2d at 1208.
48. See id. The Ortegacourt did not remand the case for the prosecutor to prove the intent to kill, holding
that the jury must have found that the defendant intended to kill his victim. Thus, Ortega is dicta. However, New
Mexico courts have adopted the proposition that second-degree murder requires that the defendant possessed an
intent to kill. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 122 N.M. 63, 65, 920 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1996); State v. Bankert, 117 N.M.
614, 621, 875 P.2d 370, 377 (1994); State v. Griffin, 116 N.M. 689, 695, 866 P.2d 1156, 1162 (1993).
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the felony murder doctrine began in State v. Harrison.49 To curb a broad application
of the felony murder doctrine, the New Mexico Supreme Court enunciated three
judicial limitations on the felony murder rule.' First, a causal relationship between
the homicide and the underlying felony must exist.5 Second, the underlying felony
must be independent of or collateral to the murder." Finally, the underlying felony
must be inherently dangerous.5 a However, the Harrisoncourt failed to discuss the
application of the collateral felony limitation on the felony murder rule. Prior to
Campos, New Mexico jurisprudence failed to delineate the proper methodology for
applying the collateral felony limitation to felony murder.'
C. Double Jeopardyas Applied to the Felony Murder Doctrine
The underlying foundation of double jeopardy is "that a person need run the
gauntlet only once."55 The United States Supreme Court has delineated a tripartite
model of an individual's protection against double jeopardy. First, the model
protects defendants against a second trial after an acquittal.56 Second, the model
protects defendants against a second trial for the identical action after a successful
conviction.57 Third, the double jeopardy clause ensures that individuals will not be
subject to multiple convictions and punishment based on a single action." The
double jeopardy clause serves both individual and societal purposes.59 However, the
"deceptively plain language [of the double jeopardy clause] has given rise to
problems both subtle and complex." t'In response to such problems, the New
Mexico Supreme Court implemented a two-prong test to ascertain whether the State
has violated a defendant's protection against double jeopardy. 61 First, the court must
determine whether the defendant was charged with two criminal offenses after he

49. 90 N.M. 439, 564 P.2d 1321 (1977).
50. See id. at 441,564 P.2d at 1323.
51. See id. The Harrisoncourt concluded that the kidnapping and rape were closely connected in time to
the homicide satisfying the causal relationship limitation placed on the felony murder rule. See id.
52. See id. The Harrisoncourt concluded that the kidnapping was independent of the homicide. See id.
53. See Harrison90 N.M. at 441,564 P.2d at 1323; State v. Pierce, 109 N.M. 596, 601,788 P.2d 352, 357
(1990). The court inHarrisonconcluded that first-degree felonies are inherently dangerous. See Harrison90 N.M.
at442, 564 P.2d at1324.
54. This Note will later discuss the application and methodology of the collateral felony limitation of the
felony murder rule. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
55. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 727 (1969).
56. See Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3,7, 810 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1991). The Double Jeopardy Clause, found
in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. The clause reads in part:"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Moreover, the New Mexico Constitution provides the same
double jeopardy protection. See N.M. CONST.art. I, § 15.
57. See Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3,7. 810 P.2d 1223, 1227 (1991).
58. See id.; see also U.S. CONST.amend. V; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 15. Analysis of an individual's double
jeopardy protection against multiple convictions and sanctions will be discussed later in this Note. See discussion
infra Part V.B.
59. See, e.g., Alan L. Adlestein, Conflict of the CriminalStatute of Limitations with Lesser Offenses at
Trial, 37 WM & MARY L. REV. 199, 264 (1995) ("Society gains efficiency by prohibiting costly repeated
prosecutions or additional punishments for the same offense, by maximizing the deterrent value of the prosecution
through public trial and sentencing in the community were the social wrong was done.").
60. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978).
61. See Swafford 112 N.M.at13,810 P.2d at 1233.
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committed a single, or unitary, act.62 If the action taken by the defendant is deemed
unitary, the court examines the legislative intent behind the two statutes she is
alleged to have violated.63 If the defendant's actions under the two statutes are
separate and distinct, she may be punished under both statutes with no violation of
the double jeopardy clause.
Turning to the "single act" prong of the double jeopardy test, when a defendant
is charged with violating multiple statutes, the court examines several factors to
determine if the defendant's action underlying the crimes is unitary. Such inquiry
focuses on the elements of the implicated statutory offenses as well as whether the
circumstances are sufficiently separated by time or by space."4 The facts presented
during the trial are also considered by the court.65
For example, in Ortega, the two victims were kidnapped more than two hours
before they were stabbed to death.' Therefore, the court determined the defendant's
actions underlying the kidnapping and the murder were not unitary. The kidnapping
was separate from the homicide. Thus, the court did not need to proceed to the
second prong of the double jeopardy test, namely legislative intent.
Another example is State v. Kersey.67 In Kersey, the New Mexico Supreme Court
affirmed the proposition that kidnapping and homicide are independent felonious
acts separated by sufficient time and space." The victim in Kersey was unlawfully
and forcibly abducted from her high school at 10:30 a.m. which completed the act
of kidnapping.69 More than two hours later and sixty miles away, the victim was
strangled and stabbed to death.70 The Kersey court properly concluded that two
separate and distinct felonious acts occurred, which were sufficiently separated by
time and space.? Thus, the defendant was convicted of and sentenced for both
kidnapping and first-degree felony murder.72
Only when the defendant's act underlying the offenses is considered unitary,
must the court proceed to the remaining "legislative intent" prong." For example,
in State v. Lopez, a gas station clerk was murdered during the course of an
attempted armed robbery. 74 Thus, the defendant's act of attempted robbery and
homicide merged into a single act. 75 Therefore, the court76 proceeded to the remaining
"legislative intent" prong of the double jeopardy test.

62. See id; see also State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486,903 P.2d 228 (1995); State v. Kersey, 120 N.M. 517,
903 P.2d 828 (1995); State v. Meadors, 122 N.M. 38, 49,908 P.2d 731,742 (1995); State v. Rodriguez, 113 N.M.
767 (Ct. App.), cert. denied 113 N.M. 636, 830 P.2d 553 (1992).
63. See Swafford 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233.
64. See idt at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233.
65. See id.
66. See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 558, 817 P.2d 1196,1200 (1991).
67. 120 N.M. 517, 903 P.2d 828 (1995).
68. See id. at 522, 903 P.2d at 833.
69. See id. at 523, 903 P.2d at 834.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 14, 810 P.2d at 1234.
74. See State v. Lopez, 122 N.M. 63, 70, 920 P.2d 1017,1024 (1996).
75. See id.
76. See id.
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Absent an express mandate from the legislature regarding punishment, the court
employs the strict elements or Blockburger test to determine legislative intent.77 If
the elements of each statutory provision with which the defendant is charged are
"subsumed" within one another, the court may not convict for both the underlying
felony and the homicide.7 However, when the elements differ, the court must
examine several factors such as: 1) whether the language, history and subject of the
statutes grant guidance to the legislature's intent; 2) whether there is a particular
evil sought to be addressed by each offense; 3) whether the policies behind each
statute differ; 4) whether the legislature intended to create separate, punishable
crimes; and 5) the quantum of punishment.79
In Swafford, the court determined that first-degree CSP was not "subsumed" by
or a sub-set of incest.80 In contrast to incest, CSP requires force or coercion."i
Further, unlike incest, the relationship between the victim of CSP and the defendant
is irrelevant.8 2 Moreover, the policy behind each statute differs. The policy behind
prohibiting CSP is to sanction "forcible, nonconsensual sexual activity and to
protect a person's important interests in uncoerced choice of sexual partners." 3 The
policy behind prohibiting incest is to sanction "sexual relations, whether consensual
or not, between relatives." Thus, the defendant's conviction and sanction for both
CSP and incest were not violative of the double jeopardy protections afforded the
defendant.8 5 As a result, the Swafford court upheld both convictions. 6
Several policies underlie the individual's protection against double jeopardy. For
example, the State is an enormous entity with vast resources and power.8 7
Therefore, repeated attempts to convict an individual serves only to injure the
individual.8 8 Rehearsed presentations also increase the risk of an erroneous
conviction.9 The double jeopardy clause also protects against multiple punishments
for the same offense. Multiple punishments run the risk of the judiciary
"prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended."'"
IV. RATIONALE OF THE CAMPOS DECISION
In Campos, the New Mexico Supreme Court discussed the adoption of the firstdegree felony murder doctrine and recognized an inherent ambiguity in the
application of the doctrine. The Campos court re-affirmed the three judicial
limitations placed on the felony murder rule in Harrison: 1) a causal relationship

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See Meadors, 121 N.M. at 42, 908 P.2d at 735; Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
See Meadors, 121 N.M. at 42, 908 P.2d at 735.
See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13-15, 810 P.2d at 1233-35.
See id. at 15, 810 P.2d at 1235.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 16, 810 P.2d at 1236.
Id.; see also State v. Hargrove, 108 N.M. 233, 238, 771 P.2d 166, 171 (1989).
See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 16, 810 P.2d at 1235.
See id.
See id. at 7, 810 P.2d at 1227.
See id. (citing Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990)).
See id.
See id.
Id. (citations omitted).
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between the homicide and the underlying felony; 2) the underlying felony must be
collateral to the murder; and 3) the underlying felony is inherently dangerous.' The
Campos court then addressed the specific assertions Campos brought forward on
appeal and discussed the rationale underlying the adoption of the strict elements test
in the analysis of the collateral felony limitation of the felony murder rule. The
court also reversed Campos' dual conviction and sanction of first-degree CSP and
in accordance with double jeopardy protections utilizing
first-degree felony murder
93
the strict elements test.
Campos' Asserted Groundsfor Reversal of First-degreeFelony Murder
On appeal, the Campos court addressed Campos' asserted grounds for reversal
of his first-degree felony murder conviction.94 Prior to Campos, New Mexico
jurisprudence failed to explicitly state a viable test analyzing the collateral felony
limitation placed on the felony murder doctrine.9 5 Campos urged the New Mexico
Supreme Court to adopt Kansas' approach to the collateral felony limitation.
Campos asserted that the court should require the underlying felony and the
homicide to be sufficiently separated by time and space.96 Therefore, because the
CSP with the handle of a mop caused the victim's death, the CSP was not collateral
to nor independent of the homicide.97 Using the strict elements test, the court
rejected Campos' assertion and concluded that first-degree CSP is collateral to or
independent of the homicide in Campos.9"
One limitation on the felony murder rule is that the underlying felony must be
independent of or collateral to the homicide." The underlying felony may not be a
A.

92. See State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 441,564 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1977).
93. See State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 162, 921 P.2d 1266, 1280 (1996).
94. See id. at 150, 921 P.2d at 1268. The court dismissed Campos' attempt to reverse his felony murder
conviction because the lower court failed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Campos knew his actions would
create great bodily harm or death. See id. at 157, 921 P.2d at 1275. The Campos decision is an unusual situation
in that the judge served as the trier of fact. See id. When initially evaluating the intoxication evidence, the trier of
fact held that he had reasonable doubt as to whether Campos knew his actions would create a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm. See id Thus, the court found reasonable doubt as to Campos' requisite mens rea for
second-degree murder, in part because of Campos' intoxication. See id. However, the court found that as a matter
of law, intoxication may not serve as a defense to second-degree murder. See id. Since Campos had no defense to
second-degree murder, the fact that he committed a felony, namely CSP, elevated the second-degree murder to firstdegree felony murder resulting in Campos's first-degree felony murder conviction. See id. A majority of the New
Mexico Supreme Court determined that the only question for their review regarding the Defendant's mens rea is
whether, as a matter of law, intoxication may serve as a defense to second-degree murder. See id. For further
discussion of intoxication as a defense to murder, see Vicki Zelle, Note, CRIMINAL LAW-The Anomaly of a
Murder: Not All First-DegreeMurder Mens Rea StandardsAre Equal-State v. Brown, 28 N.M. L. REV. __
(1998).
In his dissent, Justice Franchini criticized the majority's failure to consider the trial court's finding of reasonable
doubt as to whether the defendant knew his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. See
Campos 122 N.M. at 162, 921 P.2d at 1280. In Ortega, the Court required that a defendant charged with felony
murder must have "intended to kill (or was knowingly heedless that death might result from his conduct)." See
State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1202 (1991). Campos failed to meet such a doctrinal
requirement according to Justice Franchini's dissent.
95. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 156,921 P.2d at 1274; see supra Part HLI.B.
96. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 153, 921 P.2d at 1271.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 154, 921 P.2d at 1272.
99. See id.; see also State v. Harrison, 90 N.M. 439, 441, 564 P.2d 1321, 1323 (1977).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

lesser-included offense of the homicide."tr Although determining what constitutes
the same offense seems simple on the surface, it is "virtually kaleidoscopic in
application.''. In determining what constitutes a lesser-included offense, the New
Mexico Supreme Court analyzes the two felonies employing either the DeMary
test 02 or the strict elements test, 03 marking a shift in New Mexico criminal
jurisprudence."° Under the strict elements test, the Campos court determined that
first-degree CSP is not a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder.0 5
The Campos court extended the strict-elements test by determining whether firstdegree CSP is collateral to the murder for the first time in New Mexico." Based
on the Campos decision, the strict elements test is applicable in cases analyzing
whether the underlying felony is collateral to the homicide. Under the strict
elements test:
a court would find an offense to be a lesser-included offense of another only if
the statutory elements of the lesser offense are a sub-set of the statutory
elements of the greater offense such that it would be impossible ever
°7 to commit
the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense.
Thus, the test employed by New Mexico courts is whether a criminal may commit
second-degree murder without committing first-degree CSP.'08
At issue in the Campos decision is whether the felony, first-degree CSP, is
collateral to the homicide."° The court determined that CSP is neither a lesserincluded offense of homicide nor is it a sub-set of second-degree murder."0 CSP
requires the specific act of penetration, which is not an element of second-degree
murder."' Second-degree murder requires the defendant to act with the knowledge
that there is a strong probability of causing death or great bodily harm." 2 Thus, CSP
requires no mens rea respecting great bodily harm." 3 CSP and homicide are

100. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 154, 921 P.2d at 1272.
101. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,700 (1980).
102. The DeMary test is applicable when a jury instruction involving a crime not expressly set forth in the
indictment is requested by the prosecution. See State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 42-43, 908 P.2d 731, 735-36
(1995) (applying State v. DeMary, 99 N.M. 177, 179, 655 P.2d 1021, 1023 (1982)). The DeMary test serves as
a safeguard to the defendant's constitutional right to notice of the charging crimes. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 155,
921 P.2d at 1273. The DeMary test is inapplicable in this circumstance because the prosecution expressly charged
Campos with first-degree CSP and first-degree felony murder in his indictment. Therefore, for purposes of this
Note, the DeMary test will not be addressed.
103. See Meadors, 121 N.M. at 42, 908 P.2d at 735.
104. See id. at 42-43, 908 P.2d at 734-36.
105. See Campos at 156, 921 P.2d at 1274.
106. The strict elements test, or Blockburger test, has historically been utilized in analyzing double jeopardy
claims. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 155, 921 P.2d at 1273.
107. Meadors, 121 N.M. at 42, 908 P.2d at 735; see also Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 10-13, 810 P.2d
1223, 1230-33 (1991).
108. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 155-56, 921 P.2d at 1273-74; State v. Comeau, 109 N.M. 81, 86, 781 P.2d
1159, 1164 (Ct. App. 1989); see also Blockburger v. U.S., 284 United States 299, 304 (1932) (indicating the test
is whether each statutory requirement of each offense requires proof of additional evidence that the other does
not)(citing Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
109. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 154,921 P.2d at 1272. See also Corneau 109 N.M. at 87, 781 P.2d at 1165.
110. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 156,921 P.2d at 1274.
111. See id.; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-1 1(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
112. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 156, 921 P.2d at 1274; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1994).
113. See Campos 122 N.M. at 156,921 P.2d at 1274.
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comprised of separate and distinct elements. The court determined the two felonious
acts were not unitary. Therefore, the two felonies are independent of one another
and CSP may serve as a collateral felony to the homicide in this case." 4
The Campos Court's Review of Double Jeopardyand the Felony Murder
Doctrine
The New Mexico Supreme Court found that Campos' act of twice impaling the
handle of a mop in the victim's anus (i.e., first-degree CSP) and the victim's death
were considered a unitary act for purposes of Campos' constitutional protection
against double jeopardy."' Utilizing the strict elements test, the court concluded
that the single act of criminal sexual penetration with the handle of a mop caused
the victim's death." 6 Therefore, the "single act" prong of the double jeopardy test
enunciated in Swafford, was satisfied, and Campos could not be convicted of both
crimes.
Next, the Campos court held that first-degree CSP and first-degree felony murder
were not intended by the legislature to be punishable twice."' However, the court
did not expand on its reasoning regarding legislative intent. Therefore, the court
determined that Campos' conviction of both first-degree CSP and felony murder8
violated his constitutionally protected guarantee against double jeopardy."
Ultimately, Campos' first-degree CSP conviction and sanction was reversed in part
and remanded to the lower court for findings consistent with the New Mexico
Supreme Court's decision." 9
B.

V. ANALYSIS
The Campos court extended the strict elements test to determine whether a
felony, in this case first-degree CSP, is collateral to the homicide. This test has
historically been applied solely in the double jeopardy arena in an effort to comport
with legislative intent. However, extending the strict elements test to collateral
felony analysis may confuse future courts.
Applying the Strict Elements Test to both CollateralFelony and Double
JeopardyAnalysis Led to Opposite Results in Campos.
However salutary the general concept of "collateral felony" appears, it has
always been fraught with difficulty in its practical application, hence the desire of
the Campos court to extend the strict elements test to analyze whether a felony is
collateral to the actual homicide. Although the collateral felony analysis seems
straightforward, its practical application presents complex issues. Thus, the nature
and importance of the collateral felony limitation on felony murder mandated an
exploration of alternatives in analyzing the limitation.

A.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See id.
See id. at 161-62, 921 P.2d at 1279-80.
See id.
See id. at 162, 921 P.2d at 1280.
See id. at 161-62, 921 P.2d at 1279-80.
See id. at 162, 921 P.2d at 1280.
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In determining whether an underlying felony is collateral to the homicide in
question, the Campos court applied the strict elements test. 20 The test requires
future courts to examine and compare the statutory elements of each offense to
determine whether the elements of the underlying felony "are a sub-set of the
statutory elements of the greater offense" homicide.'' The Campos court reasoned
that first-degree CSP is not a sub-set and not subsumed by the homicide.12 As such,
the two offenses were separate and distinct.'23
However, when evaluating Campos' challenge that his conviction of both firstdegree CSP and felony murder violated his protection against double jeopardy, the
court employed the identical strict elements test. The court held that Campos'
conduct underlying the first-degree CSP and the homicide "was unitary," a single
act. 24 The court also noted "that the legislature did not intend to punish Campos
twice for the same killing."'' 25 Therefore, Campos' multiple convictions violated the
double jeopardy clause.
By extending the strict elements test to analyze whether the underlying felony is
collateral to the homicide, the court reached the opposite conclusion that was
reached in the double jeopardy analysis. When deciding whether CSP was collateral
to homicide, the court concluded that first-degree CSP and first-degree felony
murder were distinct. 26 However, when deciding whether Campos' protection
against double jeopardy was violated by a conviction of both first-degree CSP and
conduct underlying first-degree CSP and
felony murder, the court concluded the 27
first-degree felony murder was unitary.
The Campos court did state that the strict elements tests applied in the collateral
felony arena and in the double jeopardy arena were distinct for three reasons. First,
the purpose behind each test differs. The collateral felony doctrine analyzes whether
the felony murder rule applies in the instant case.' The double jeopardy analysis
focuses on whether the defendant may be punished twice. 29 However, this
argument fails because the application and methodology of the strict elements test
as applied to collateral felony and double jeopardy analysis is identical. The basis
for following the test is irrelevant to its actual application.
The Campos court also noted that the collateral felony doctrine analysis only
included the examination of the statutory elements and that the facts of the case are
irrelevant."3 The court should take into consideration the statutory elements of the
two charged offenses as well as the facts of each particular case when analyzing a

120. See supra Part V.A.
121. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 155,921 P.2d at1273 (quoting State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 42, 908 P.2d
731, 735 (1995)).
122. See id. at 156, 921 P.2d at 1274.
123. See id.
124. See id. it161-62, 921 P.2d at 1279-80.
125. Id. at 162, P.2d at 1280 (citation omitted). See also Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 15, 810 P.2d 1223,
1235 (1991).
126. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 156, 921 P.2d at 1274.
127. See id. at 162, 921 P.2d at 1280.
128. See id. at 156, 921 P.2d 1274.
129. See id.
130. See id.
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defendant's protection against double jeopardy.' 3' The factual distinction the court
draws upon is illusory. Regardless of the particular facts of a case, the court has
traditionally looked to the statutory elements and legislative intent when analyzing
whether an individual's protection against double jeopardy has been violated.'32
Lastly, the court determined that when the underlying felony is a lesser-included
offense of second-degree murder, the felony is not collateral to the homicide and the
defendant may not be convicted of felony murder. 133 Double jeopardy analysis does
not analyze whether the two felonies are lesser-included offenses of one another.
This distinction is also illusory. The very definition of the strict elements test
enunciated in Meadors and Swafford directs a court to determine whether an offense
is a
lesser-included offense of another only if the statutory elements of the lesser
offense are a sub-set of the statutory elements of the greater offense such that
it would be impossible ever to commit the greater offense without also
committing the lesser offense.'
Therefore, double jeopardy analysis traditionally analyzes whether one felony is a
lesser included offense of another.
In this case, the court analyzed Campos' first-degree CSP to determine if the
felony murder doctrine was applicable. Under the strict elements test, the court
concluded that CSP was not a sub-set of second-degree murder. 135 CSP and seconddegree murder contained different statutory elements. 136 Thus, CSP may serve
137as the
underlying felony for felony murder because it is collateral to the murder.
The Court Departedfrom the TraditionalTwo-Prong Double Jeopardy Test
The Campos court stated that it applied the two prong double jeopardy test
enunciated in Swafford when it concluded that Campos' conviction for both firstdegree CSP and first-degree felony murder violated his constitutional protection
against double jeopardy. 138 However, the court failed to expand on its rationale for
rendering such a conclusion. Opponents of such a conclusion would argue that
under the two prong double jeopardy test enunciated in Swafford, both of Campos'
convictions should stand.
Under the strict elements test, the statutory elements of CSP may not be subsumed by the statutory elements of homicide. In concluding that CSP is collateral
to the homicide in this case, the Campos court concluded that the elements of CSP
are not subsumed by the elements of homicide. Accordingly, the two acts were
separate and distinct not unitary. However, when applying the same test in the
B.

131. See id.
132. See, e.g., State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486, 903 P.2d 228 (1995); State v. Kersey, 120 N.M. 517, 903
P.2d 828 (1995); Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (1991);
133. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 155, 921 P.2d 1273.
134. State v. Meadors, 121 N.M. 38, 42, 908 P.2d 731, 735 (1995); see also Swafford, 112 N.M. at 10-13,
810 P.2d at 1230-33.
135. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 156, 921 P.2d at 1274.
136. See supra Part V.A.
137. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 160, 921 P.2d at 1274.
138. See id. at 166, 921 P.2d at 1280.
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double jeopardy analysis, the court concluded that Campos' conduct while
committing CSP and homicide was the result of a unitary act.
Assuming arguendo, the court was correct in deciding that the conduct
underlying CSP and homicide was caused by a single act, the court should analyze
the "legislative intent" prong of the double jeopardy test. However, the court failed
to examine legislative intent in this case.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A.

Policy Considerations
In Campos, the New Mexico Supreme Court departed from its traditional double
jeopardy analysis. Strong policy considerations, such as stability and predictability,
support the notion of adherence to precedent. Reliance on judicial principles is core
to the foundation of a judicial system. However, in the instant case, reliance and
adherence to precedent may have been violated.'39
In Campos, the New Mexico Supreme Court reversed the defendant's dual
conviction and sanction for first-degree CSP and first-degree felony murder
irrespective of the two prong double jeopardy test enunciated in Swafford. t4 In
1991, the Swafford court concluded that the strict elements test should be utilized
in determining whether the defendant's conduct for both the underlying felony and
the homicide was unitary for purposes of double jeopardy analysis. If Campos'
conduct was unitary, the court should proceed to determine whether the legislature
intended to punish the defendant for CSP and homicide separately. Such analysis
requires an inquiry into: 1) whether the language, history and subject of the statutes
grant guidance to the legislature's intent; 2) whether there is a particular evil sought
to be remedied by each offense; 3) whether the policies behind each statute differ;
4) whether the legislature intended to create separate, punishable crimes; and 5) the
quantum of punishment. 41 In this case, the court failed to analyze the underlying
felony and homicide under the two prong Swafford double jeopardy test. However,
double jeopardy analysis is "controlled by legislative intent (whether the legislature
intended to set up14different
offenses), rather than by a test independent of the
2
legislative intent."'

139. Although the reasonable doubt issue raised in the Campos decision is not a focus of this paper, it is
important to note that the Campos court upheld Campos' conviction irrespective of the lower court's finding of
reasonable doubt of his requisite mens rea. In 1991, the Ortega Court overruled its prior decisions that the felony
murder doctrine imposed no mens rea requirement. See State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 544, 557, 817 P.2d 1196, 1199
(1991). A long string of cases following Ortega explicitly imposed a mens rea requirement on the felony murder
doctrine. See Campos, 122 N.M. 148,921 P.2d 1266; State v. Contreras, 120 N.M. 486,903 P.2d 228 (1995); State
v. Griffin, 116 N.M. 689, 866 P.2d 1156 (1993). Campos must have intended to kill his victim. Minimally, Campos
must have known that his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, the requisite mens rea
for second-degree murder. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(B)(Repl. Pamp. 1994). The lower court had reasonable
doubt of Campos intent and knowledge. See Campos, 122 N.M. at 157, 921 P.2d at 1275.
140. See supra Part IIl.C.
141. See Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 13, 810 P.2d 1223, 1233 (1991).
142. James A. Shellenberger & James A. Strazzella, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine and the
Constitution: The Development of Due Process and Double Jeopardy Remedies, 79 MARQ. L REV. 1 (1995); see
also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (legislative intent is essential in Double Jeopardy Clause analysis
to determine whether multiple punishment is constitutional); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 688 (1980)
(multiple punishments cannot be resolved without determining legislative intent).
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The court should analyze the above Swafford factors in determining whether the
legislature intended to punish Campos separately for CSP and first-degree murder.
For example, the policy behind CSP is to sanction "forcible, nonconsensual sexual
activity and to protect a person's important interests in uncoerced choice of sexual
partners."' 43 On the other hand, the policy behind felony murder is to sanction
conduct that creates a strong probability of death and to protect the safety and life
of innocent citizens.'" Further, the particular evil sought to be deterred by each
offense differs. Sanctioning CSP is an attempt to prevent forced sexual activity.
Sanctioning felony murder is an attempt to prevent the death of innocent
individuals.
Ironically, Swafford is analogous to Campos. In Swafford, the defendant was
convicted of both criminal sexual penetration and incest, both of which the New
Mexico Supreme Court upheld. Swafford unsuccessfully argued that the criminal
sexual penetration and incest resulted from the same or unitary act.4 5 The Swafford
court concluded that the statutory elements of CSP and incest differed; the policy
46
objectives differed; and the legislature intended to sanction both evils separately.
Therefore, the double jeopardy protection afforded the defendant in Swafford was
not violated.
Turning to the particular facts of this case, CSP is "not a continuing offense,
rather it is completed upon penetration."'' 47 In this case, once Campos forced the
handle of the mop into his victim's anus, he committed and completed first-degree
CSP. The victim, Gutierrez, died hours later at the hospital several miles from
Salcido's home, where the CSP occurred.
This very issue was examined by the Kersey court which held that kidnapping
and murder were separate and distinct crimes which could be punished separately
in accordance with legislative intent. The Kersey court concluded that once the
victims were forcibly taken from the high school, the act of kidnapping was
completed. Therefore, the victim's subsequent murder was separate and distinct
from the kidnapping.
Under the two prong double jeopardy test, which the Campos court admits is the
proper test, Campos' convictions for both first-degree CSP and first-degree felony
murder were constitutional and should have been upheld.
The Need for Clarificationof the Strict Elements Test.
For the first time in New Mexico jurisprudence, the New Mexico Supreme Court
extended the strict elements test to the collateral felony prong of the felony murder
rule. Under the strict elements test, the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that
first-degree CSP and homicide were separate and distinct 4 ' because the offenses
B.

143. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at 15, 810 P.2d at 1234.
144. See State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148, 154, 810 P.2d 1266, 1272 (1996); State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554,
563, 817 P.2d 1196, 1205 (1991).
145. See Swafford, 112 N.M. at7, 810 P.2d at 1227.
146. See id. at 14-15, 810 P.2d at 1234-35.
147. See State v. Comeau, 109 N.M. 81, 86, 781 P.2d 1159, 1164 (Ct. App.) cert. denied (1989); State v.
Ramirez, 92 N.M. 206, 585 P.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1978).
148. See supra Part IV.A.
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contained separate elements. However, when the court applied the same strict
elements test to its double jeopardy analysis the court reached the opposite
conclusion. It determined that Campos' conduct underlying the felony and the
homicide was a single, unitary act for purposes of the double jeopardy analysis.
Application of the strict elements test in the collateral felony arena of the same case
led to the opposite conclusion. As a result, the court should reconcile the test's
application.
Attempting to merge the analysis of two very different and extraordinarily
complex doctrines is not a viable or clear solution. Legislative action is the only
viable and explicit solution. It is difficult to define the connection between the
commission of the underlying felony and the homicide. As a result, the New Mexico
legislature should enact a statute explicitly enumerating which felonies may elevate
a homicide committed during the course of an inherently dangerous felony to firstdegree felony murder. 49 The legislature should explore the juxtaposition
relationship of the collateral felony limitation to felony murder and double jeopardy
protections.
The extreme position of abolishing felony murder is yet another possibility. The
drafters of the Model Penal Code intended to abolish the felony murder doctrine.
However, "such a course was thought to be impolitic, given the weight of
prosecutive opposition." 50 Therefore, abolishment of the felony murder rule is
unlikely.
C.

Campos,' Convictionfor Felony Murder is Ultimately Correctfor Public
Policy
Campos not once, but twice, forcibly impaled the entire length of the handle of
a mop into his victim's anus. Laughing, he then left his victim naked, lying outside
with the mop bulging from his shoulder. Campos ran inside Ms. Salcido's home
when he heard police approaching and pretended to sleep. Campos' acts were
beyond dangerous, they were heinous. The judiciary maintains an interest in
protecting the health and safety of its citizens. Although the lower court may have
found reasonable doubt on a technical legal issue, the New Mexico Supreme Court
may find support from a strong public opinion. Further, punishment for such actions
is consistent with the legislature's criminal sanctions approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
In State v. Campos, the court extended the strict elements test to determine
whether the underlying felony, CSP, was collateral to the homicide. The court also
examined New Mexico's approach to the felony murder doctrine, which was
intended solely to elevate second-degree murder to first-degree felony murder when
the underlying felony is collateral to the homicide. First-degree criminal sexual
penetration, under the strict elements test, is a collateral felony. Thus, Campos was
convicted of first-degree felony murder. Although the result in Campos may be

149. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §13-1105.A.2. (West 1997).
150. Herbert Weschler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal Code, 68
COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1446 (1968).
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correct with regard to public opinion, it fails to comport with New Mexico
precedent. The court's decision resulted in two opposite conclusions while applying
the same test to the same facts in the same case. The court's failure to address such
a dispositive issue may cause confusion among the courts in New Mexico. The New
Mexico Supreme Court must clarify whether the strict elements test is the proper
test for determining whether an underlying felony is a unitary act with the homicide,
which has double jeopardy implications. Lastly, the court must determine whether
double jeopardy analysis must pass both the "single act" and "legislative intent"
prongs of traditional Swafford double jeopardy analysis.
KIMBERLY A. RICHARDS

